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The recent revival of interest in problems
of nationalism among social scientists has
several sources. Nationalistic rivalries hold
more threat than ever because of the de-
velopment of the technology of destruction.
Within our own nation the emergence of
radical right movements and the related
ideology of super-patriotism produce pres-
sures for a more aggressive foreign policy.
On the other hand, for the emerging nations,
nationalism is often seen as a positive unify-
ing force in overcoming tribal rivalries.
National Involvement
The core referent of the concept of na-
tionalism appears to be an individual’s emo-
tional attachment to his nation or country
which leads him to desire more power for it.
The concept thus refers to one form of in-
volvement of an individual in his country’s
affairs and to the ideology associated with it.
However, it has weaknesses as an adequate
concept for two reasons. First, the term is
subject to value-laden interpretations, based
on the popularly perceived desirability of
patriotism on the one hand and the unde-
sirability of chauvinism and jingoism on the
other. Second, it is apparent that nationalism
is only one aspect of the broader problem of
how individuals relate to the nation-state,
how they are integrated into it, and how this
integration affects their attitudes, values, and
behavior.
From a scientific point of view, the re-
lationship of the individual to his country
can be studied at two levels, the social-
system level and the social-psychological
level. At the system level, one would be
concerned with the prevailing ideology that
defines this relationship, and with the ef-
fects on this ideology of the country’s inter-
national environment and of the basic func-
tional problems facing it at that point in
time. One could investigate such problems
by analyzing documents and pronounce-
1 This paper is part of a research program on
national role involvement sponsored by the
Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at
the University of Michigan. Additional financial
support for the study reported here was pro-
vided by Public Health Service Research Grant
MH-07280-07 from the National Institute of
Mental Health for a research program on social
influence and behavior change (Herbert C.
Kelman, principal investigator). We are in-
debted to Richard Flacks who collaborated with
us in the original formulation of the project and
who initiated the study reported here. We are
also grateful to Mark Chesler for his valuable
assistance in the initial phase of the study.
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ments of national leaders, and relating these
to various institutional arrangements and to
the values transmitted by these institutions.
At the social-psychological level, the focus
is shifted to the individual and his immedi-
ate social environment. Here one is pri-
marily concerned with the individual’s view
of his relation to the nation-state-his be-
liefs concerning his obligations to the system
and vice versa, the mechanisms that involve
him in the system, and the attitudes and
values he holds as a function of this involve-
ment. It is assumed that there will be some
general components of this ideology that are
held by all or most members of the system;
these would presumably be a function of the
nature of the state itself. But there will also
be variation across individuals, e.g., in the
intensity of their commitment, the compo-
nents of the ideology that they emphasize,
or the type of mechanism that binds them
into the system. These variations might be
a function of various demographic factors, of
position in the political structure, and of
personality variables.
A concept that allows one to integrate
the system level of analysis and the social-
psychological level is the role of national.
Thus, one can conceive of the nation-state
as a system of roles, and of each individual
as enacting a particular role within this sys-
tem. At the system level, the national ideol-
ogy (which justifies the existence of the
system) defines the appropriate role be-
haviors for members (i.e., sets expectations),
specifies the conditions under which such
behaviors are required, and designates vari-
ous attitudes and values as valid. This ideol-
ogy is built into and/or manifested by politi-
cal institutions, especially the legal system;
it is communicated by those holding high
positions in the national system, and trans-
mitted to individuals via mass media and
socializing agencies.
At the same time, a role-definition can be
viewed as a characteristic of the individual,
acquired in the course of his socialization.
One can investigate his definition of the
national role and his expectations concern-
ing appropriate behavior and attitudes rela-
tive to those held by other nationals. One
can also study his role enactment: the sa-
lience of the role for him, the cues he re-
sponds to, the behaviors he performs, and
the strength of his commitment to the role.
One would expect different segments of the
society to differ in their conception of what
is expected of them as nationals and in their
actual behavior as a function of their differ-
ent positions in the role system. Thus the
concept of role allows one to analyze both
constancies and variations at both the system
and social-psychological levels.2 2
The study to be reported here focuses on
the social-psychological level of analysis.
The system level is discussed only where
it illuminates our findings concerning indi-
viduals.
In sum, we conceive of national involve-
ment as a role relationship between the per-
son and the nation. From the point of view
of the individual, the national role consists
of his expectations about the way in which
he and others within the society should be-
have with respect to the maintenance and
welfare of the nation. It is assumed that
these expectations will vary as a function of
2 It should be noted that, in discussing the
role of a national, we are focusing only on the
individual’s relationship to the political system
or state. We are not concerned here with the
problem of his relationship to the national cul-
ture and its common language, history, and
tradition. A complete analysis of the relation-
ship between individual and nation would also
consider his ties to this cultural system, i.e., his
cultural identification with the nation, and the
reciprocal relations between the cultural and
political systems within the nation (cf. Kelman,
1969).
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the individual’s position in the role system
that is the nation-state.
MODES OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION
Following Katz and Kahn (1966), we can
distinguish three major means by which a
role system is integrated: through values,
norms, and roles.
Any role system is linked to a set of values
which justifies its goals and continued opera-
tion. These values provide rationales for
organizational activities, legitimacy for the
demands the system makes on members, and
symbolic rewards for membership and for
members’ positive contributions to system
functioning. In the United States, for exam-
ple, the value system centers around such
concepts as democracy, equality before the
law, and freedom in its various forms for all
members of the nation-state. These values
are usually closely associated with a variety
of symbols which represent the nation and
the national values themselves. In the United
States, such symbols include the American
flag, the national anthem, the Constitution,
and the Presidency. To the extent that mem-
bers are socialized to identify with these
symbols and values, a strong source of sys-
tem integration results.
The role system is elaborated through a
set of norms that specify appropriate and
inappropriate behaviors for those holding a
given position within the system. These
norms are specifications or &dquo;operational&dquo;
statements of system values, and are typically
established to ensure that those functions
vital to system maintenance and success are
performed. The norms are accompanied by
a set of sanctions designed to reward con-
formity to them and punish deviation from
them. These norms and sanctions constitute
a second source of integration to the extent
that they induce appropriate behaviors.
Finally, a system is integrated through the
interdependencies created by the role struc-
ture itself. The rewards obtained by each
member depend not only on his own role per-
formance, but on satisfactory performance
by others whose roles are reciprocal to his.
This mutual interdependence creates a strong
motivation for each member to meet the ex-
pectations that go with his role and thus to
keep the system intact.
The functioning of any social system is
closely related to the effectiveness of these
mechanisms for producing integration. In
most national systems the three modes re-
inforce each other. The demands of the
national role are reinforced by norms and by
related sanctions, and both the norms and
the role requirements are justified by ap-
peals to system values. But the emphasis
given each mode may vary greatly across
nations, and within the same nation over
time (cf. Katz, Kelman, and Flacks, 1964).
TYPES OF NATIONAL INVOLVEMENT
Just as national role systems differ in the
degree to which each mode of integration is
present and/or emphasized, individual role
players differ with respect to the manner in
which they are involved in the national role.
The types of individual involvement parallel
the modes of system integration discussed
above.
An individual may be symbolically inte-
grated or committed to the national role.
Such a commitment is characterized by a
strong emotional investment in the nation
and its values, and a positive affective orien-
tation to its symbols. A symbolically inte-
grated individual gives a high priority to his
role as a national, and derives direct and
intrinsic emotional satisfaotions from his
enactment of this role.
The second type is a normative commit-
ment to the national role. It is characterized
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by an orientation toward the sanctions at-
tached to the national role expectations as
the individual perceives them. There is rela-
tively little emotional investment in the role
peer se. The individual conforms to the role-
expectations because he accepts the system
as equitable and because he anticipates nega-
tive consequences for failure to conform.
Third, the individual’s commitment to the
role may be a f unctional one. This commit-
ment is based on an instrumental relation-
ship to the ongoing system-on the rewards
he perceives as the outcome of participation
in the system. He views these rewards as
important, and is committed to the system
because he wishes to continue receiving
them.
Finally, there are individuals who are
alienated from the national system, for
whom the national role is never positively
salient nor enacted. For such persons,
neither the emotional nor the material re-
wards derivable from enactment are suf-
ficient to produce the behavior; similarly,
the sanctions for failure to conform are not
sufficiently threatening.
It is assumed that most members of the
nation-state are motivated to adopt the
national role, when appropriate, through one
or more of these mechanisms. Also, each
member is perhaps characterized by a
primary involvement through one type.
Whether his involvement is due to attach-
ment to symbols and values, or concern with
norms, or concern with the functional re-
wards of participation should depend on
his socialization, his position in the social
system, and the orientation of those social
groups with which he is affiliated. Each
type of involvement should be associated
with different expectations about the ap-
propriate role of a national, and with specific
attitudes toward a variety of national and
international issues.
Hypotheses3
The present formulation yields a number
of specific predictions about the character-
istics of individuals whose involvement in
the national role is of a given type. Predic-
tions can also be made about the content of
the national role as perceived by each type
of individual; these predictions represent a
definitional specification of the typology
presented above.
SYMBOLIC COMMITMENT
Americans whose commitment to the na-
tional role is primarily a symbolic one are
expected to be characterized by the follow-
ing attitudes:
( a ) Strong positive affect for national sym-
bols, such as the national anthem, the flag, and
national leaders.
( b ) Emphasis on the learning and enactment
of the role of &dquo;American,&dquo; as compared to other
roles, e.g., occupational, religious, and com-
munity roles.
( c ) Low tolerance for any behavior that de-
viates from perceived role prescriptions, or that
places a greater priority on values viewed as in-
compatible with Americanism.
(d) Defensiveness against criticism of the
American system or way of life.
( e ) Readiness to deny civil liberties to those
who advocate radical change.
(f) Hostility toward alien values and life
styles; approval of actions that would extend
the American way of life.
( g ) Opposition to policies that would weaken
American sovereignty, reduce national power,
or reflect negatively on national honor.
There are certain similarities between
these characteristics and Durkheim’s concep-
tion of mechanical solidarity (cf. 1952). The
present conception of functional integration
in turn parallels his concept of organic soli-
darity. Symbolic commitment is prevalent
during the early stages of the development
3 The material in this section is based on Katz
et al., 1964.
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of a nation, when many diverse ethnic
groups, language communities, and interest
groups must be united under a common
system. Symbols are an effective way to
achieve such integration. Much of what is
presently occurring in many of the emerging
African nations seems to fit this pattern.
However, such integration appears to be
relatively brittle in a changing society, and
is less conducive to a truly stable system
than is widespread functional integration,
based on mutual dependence for the satis-
faction of interests. As Durkheim noted, the
transition to organic solidarity (i. e., func-
tional interdependence) occurs with increas-
ing specialization of roles in society; it is
particularly hastened by bureaucratization.
(For an elaboration, see Katz, 1965).
We therefore expect symbolic commit-
ment to be weak in contemporary American
society relative to normative and functional
mechanisms. We would expect the principal
cause of strong symbolic involvement in this
country to be the experience or threat of a
disruption of an individual’s functional ties
to the system, particularly if this disruption
affects his central values, his status in the
system, or his power. Symbolic commitment
can thus be a means of reducing anxiety, of
achieving a sense of identity and integration
in a society that has become too complex
and difficult to comprehend, or of restoring
lost power.
Technology, bureaucratization, and mana-
gerialism in contemporary America have
posed threats to the power of the old middle
class. The traditional ties to the system of
the individual entrepreneur, small business-
man, and farmer have been disrupted by
these developments. Such threats have also
been felt by such groups as rural and small-
town dwellers, and fundamentalist Protes-
tants. According to many observers (e.g.,
Bell, ] 963), these social categories are heavily
represented in the John Birch Society and
similar super-patriot groups-organizations
that constitute the purest case of symbolic
commitment in America today.4 Many other
people who fall into these categories may be
characterized by a symbolic commitment,
though they may not belong to ultra-right
groups.
NORMATIVE COMMITMENT
Persons who are well integrated into
stable occupational, religious, and other role
systems, and who have satisfactory primary
relations, should have a low degree of sym-
bolic commitment. These roles will be their
primary concern in their daily lives, and their
national role will be latent much of the time.
However, they will perceive conformity to
national role prescriptions as important for
maintaining their identity and/or their status
and position in the system. We expect this
pattern of normative commitment to charac-
terize the majority of Americans. They are
expected to exhibit the following attitudes:
( a ) Mild positive affect for national symbols.
(b) Equal or greater emphasis on other roles
as compared to the national role.
( c ) Tendency to describe the American way
of life as their ordinary way of life, and to sup-
port policies that preserve and protect it; greater
emphasis on aiding and preserving America’s
way of life than on aiding other countries.
( d ) Relatively low level of information, par-
ticipation, and interest in political affairs.
( e ) Passive acceptance of responsibilities of
the national role, and expectation that others
will so accept them.
4 The super-patriot movement is also sup-
ported by another group of persons who are ex-
periencing status incongruence. Those whose
economic power has increased tremendously in
recent years but who have little political power,
e.g., new millionaires in the Southwest and
West, appear to be the principal financial sup-
porters of the movement. Members of the old
middle class appear to comprise the active
workers.
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( f ) Tendency to accept any policy that they
perceive as generally agreed upon, especially if
advocated by national leaders.
We would expect such a commitment to
be primarily found in the lower-middle and
working classes, among persons who have
some functional connection to the system
through their occupations and are tied to the
community by primary and family relations,
but who have no particular responsibility for
the maintenance of the system or of major
institutions within it. The conformity and
indifference characteristic of this type of
integration probably depend heavily on the
absence of any perceived threat to the indi-
vidual’s established ties. Such a threat would
be expected to shift persons so committed to
the more intense symbolic involvement.
FUNCTIONAL COMMITMENT
The functionally committed are those who
derive major rewards from their participa-
tion in the system; alternatively, these re-
wards may come from political, religious, or
social institutions whose maintenance they
view as dependent on the effective function-
ing of the larger national system. They de-
fine their role as nationals in terms of their
institutional responsibilities. Such individu-
als should be characterized by the following
attitudes:
(a) Low affect for national symbols.
(b) Definition of the national role in terms
of political or social responsibilities.
(c) Relative satisfaction with system rewards
and system opportunities.
( d ) Relatively high level of information, par-
ticipation, and interest in political affairs.
(e) Support for policies they view as in-
strumental to the national interest.
We would expect such a commitment to
occur primarily among the upper-middle
and upper classes, and among those with
considerable education. It should also char-
acterize those whose power and status are
being enhanced by current patterns of social
or political change. It should be especially
characteristic of top administrators in bureau-
cratic organizations.
ALIENATION
Alienation from the national system, a re-
jection of the emotional and material bene-
fits derived from participation in it, and a
willingness to suffer the consequences of
nonconformity to the prescriptions of the
national role would be expected where there
are few or no direct ties between the indi-
vidual and the system. Such a condition may
be characteristic of members of disadvan-
taged minorities and deviant subcultures. If
active rejection of the national role is to
occur among members of such groups, one
can expect that there will be alternative
value systems to which they can relate them-
selves.
Messianic religious movements, revolu-
tionary social movements, and even some
nativistic groups often offer such alternative
values. Thus an important characteristic
shared by such diverse groups as Jehovah’s
Witnesses, the Communist Party in the
United States, and the Black Muslims is that
they reject the duties of the American na-
tional role and the values underlying it.
Instead they call for a &dquo;higher&dquo; loyalty to
some system of values that transcends the
American state. It is significant to note that
these movements appeal to the deprived and
poorly integrated segments of the popula-
tion.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF TYPES OF NATIONAL
INVOLVEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL
ATTITUDES
We hypothesize that symbolic commit-
ment will be associated with more hostility
toward other nations than functional com-
mitment, more perception of hostility on the
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part of other nations toward the individual’s
own country, less willingness to cooperate
with these nations, and less willingness to
support attempts at international organiza-
tion such as the United Nations. The ration-
ale for this hypothesis is that symbolic
commitment takes on a life of its own while
functional involvement is concerned with
individual and group interest. Commitment
of a symbolic character is enhanced when
national symbols maintain their purity and
power in reflecting national identity; it is
threatened by competition and conflict with
the symbols of outgroups. Functional com-
mitment, on the other hand, is strengthened
as the rewards of the system to its members
increase.
Since international cooperation can pro-
vide increased rewards to the members of a
national state, functionally committed per-
sons are more open to it. Under certain con-
ditions, it is true, the functionally involved
will push for an aggressive foreign policy if
their nation has the power to achieve its
goals with little cost by such a policy. Our
general assumption, however, is that the
risks of war in producing an atomic holo-
caust and the difficulties of coercion by
military means in the modem world are
sufficiently great to make the functionally
committed more interested in seeking other
solutions.
We would predict, moreover, that norma-
tively committed people would fall between
the symbolic and the functional groups in
their attitudes toward other nations and
toward international cooperation. They
would tend to follow the positions of national
leaders and, for the period during which our
interviews were conducted, the national lead-
ership occupied a position somewhere be-
tween the functional requirements of the
situation and symbolic demands of the peo-
ple as these leaders perceived them.
Within this basic theoretical framework
for analyzing the individual’s relationship to
his nation-state, a survey was designed to
test the predictions presented above.
Methods
THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
The interview schedule had two parts.5
Part I consisted of questions directly related
to the respondent’s conception of his role as
a national. It included questions designed
to tap the nature of the respondents’ ties
with the United States, his conception of
what constituted a &dquo;good&dquo; and a &dquo;bad&dquo;
American, and his general conception of the
important things for an individual to learn
and know. There was also a series of ques-
tions concerning the responsibilities an indi-
vidual has toward his government, and the
areas of life in which the government can
legitimately make demands on its citizens.
Finally, one group of questions inquired
into the respondent’s conception of the dif-
ferences between the US and other coun-
tries.
Part II consisted primarily of attitudinal
items and demographic questions. Questions
were designed to tap attitudes that were
expected to be related to the nature of one’s
ties to his country, including the type of
organizations the respondent supported, and
his feelings about the assassination of Presi-
dent Kennedy. Perhaps the largest set of
attitude questions dealt with foreign affairs,
inquiring into attitudes toward Russia, Cuba,
the US foreign aid program, the amount of
power which should be given to the US
military, the efficacy and potential of the
United Nations and the World Court, and
5 The questionnaire was primarily the work of
Richard Flacks, Herbert Kelman, and Daniel
Katz. Flacks also assisted in the development of
the coding manual.
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attitudes toward world disarmament. Fi-
nally, a series of items was included to ob-
tain standard demographic data, as well as
some indication of the nature and intensity
of the respondent’s ties with other persons
and voluntary organizations.6 6
The final schedule contained 252 items.7
This schedule required considerable time to
administer, with the range running from two
to five hours; interview time averaged about
three hours.
THE SAMPLE
A member of the sampling staff of the
Survey Research Center at the University
of Michigan chose a random sample of 200
households from the city directory for the
Greater Ann Arbor Area. He was instructed
to exclude anyone whose occupation indi-
cated an obvious affiliation with the Uni-
versity. This was done to ensure that the
sample would be representative of non-
university-affiliated persons, and to avoid
the oversampling of such people, relative to
the national population, that would occur in
a completely random sample of residents of
this area.
Letters were sent to the interviewees ex-
plaining that the recipient had been ran-
domly selected to be interviewed, that the
study was a legitimate research activity, that
their responses would be entirely confiden-
tial, and that their cooperation was desired.
These letters were sent approximately one
week prior to the attempt to make initial
contact with the respondent.
Interviewers were instructed to conduct
the interviews with the respondent alone if
possible; they were successful in almost all
cases. Also, each interviewer was instructed
to interview only the head of the household
or his spouse, and to interview about half
males and half females. They followed these
directions in both cases; the final sample
included 54 percent males and 46 percent
females.
Of the 200 initial names, 129 were com-
pletely interviewed.g 8 Due to limitations of
time, and the belief that the 129 interviews
obtained were well-done and thus adequate,
the 71 uncompleted interviews were not
replaced.
6 This schedule was developed out of a pre-
test questionnaire administered to some 30 resi-
dents of the Ann Arbor, Michigan, area. The
pretest interviews were used to assess the ef-
fectiveness of each item in eliciting relevant
information, and to determine areas where inter-
viewing aids and special interviewer training
would be needed.
7 There were 114 open-end items and appro-
priate probes. There were also 75 forced choice
items; in cases where the categories provided
were numerous and/or lengthy, the alternatives
were presented to the respondent printed on
5" X 8" index cards. Forty mixed questions
were employed, whose wording implied possible
responses (e.g., "Have you heard of the Black
Muslims?" "Does the military have too much
power or not enough?"). Finally, 23 items re-
quired the interviewee to rank five or more
alternatives in order of preference or impor-
tance ; in each case, alternatives were presented
on a prepared index card.
8 In 10 cases, interviewers had to return a
second time to complete an interrupted inter-
view. All others were completed in one session.
Three interviews were not completed. In one
case, the interviewee was called away, and the
interviewer was unable to reestablish contact;
in the other two, the respondent terminated the
interview. Further, 22 persons refused to be
interviewed. An additional fifteen persons could
not be contacted during the two and one-half
month interviewing period. Of the remaining
31 sample addresses, fourteen no longer existed
(the sample was taken from the 1962 City
Directory; interviews were conducted during
April-June of 1964); their nonexistence was
verified in most cases by the return of the un-
delivered contact letter. The other 17 addresses
were either vacant at the time of interviewing,
or had been converted to businesses.
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THE INTERVIEWERS
The interviews were conducted by the
principal author, and by one paid male and
six paid female interviewers. The inter-
viewers were between the ages of 25 and 40,
and had previous experience as interviewers
for various research units within the Uni-
versity. The interviewers were given some
additional training which focused on the
intent of various questions and the circum-
stances in which probes should be used.
Care was taken to sensitize them to ques-
tions on which the respondent might have
difficulty or be inclined not to answer, and
techniques were suggested for avoiding or
solving such problems.
Each interviewer completed from five to
twenty interviews. With each interview re-
turned, the interviewer included a brief
written resume concerning the respondent,
an estimate of his seriousness and sincerity
in answering the questions, the number of
contacts attempted before reaching him, the
setting(s) and time(s) of day of the interview,
and any unusual difficulties. In all but a
few instances, these resumes gave us no
reason to doubt the validity of the data.
CODING AND RELIABILITY
As noted in footnote 7, 23 items required
the respondent to rank alternatives and 75
were closed-end items. For these, the ap-
propriate response categories were readily
apparent. For some demographic items, ex-
cellent codes were adopted from previous
Survey Research Center studies (for occupa-
tion, religious preference, birthplace, age,
and education).
For the remaining items, codes were de-
veloped on the basis of both the type of data
the item was designed to elicit and the re-
sponses made to it. Twenty-five of the in-
terviews (done by different interviewers)
were chosen, and a typescript prepared of
TABLE 1
CODING RELIABILITY: NUMBER OF ITEMS
ATTAINING GIVEN LEVELS OF AGREEMENT
the responses elicited by each item. These
typescripts were studied, and a code was de-
veloped to capture as much relevant infor-
mation as possible. In several cases, multi-
ple codes were developed for responses to a
single question. Finally, 21 indices were
constructed, each of which summarized re-
sponses to several individual questions or
required the coder to make some overall
inference from the actual responses them-
selves. The completed manual contained
325 codes.
One person coded the entire set of 129
interviews.9 She was initially trained by
the principal author. Special care was taken
with those codes or indices which required
inferences on her part. Following training,
the coder and the senior author indepen-
dently coded 14 complete interviews. The
two judgments were compared for each item
on each interview, and all cases of disagree-
ment were discussed and resolved by con-
sensus. From this initial check, a number
of ambiguities in the code were discovered
and eliminated.
In addition to the 14 interviews which
9 The authors are sincerely indebted to
Michelle Schurgin for three months of hard and
sometimes monotonous work on this task.
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TABLE 2
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE (N = 129)
1 Includes Presbyterian, Episcop alian, Lutheran, Congregational and Reform Churches.2 Includes Methodist, Bapt t, Disciples of Christ, and AME Churches.
were independently coded to check the ade-
quacy of the coder’s training, 11 interviews
which the coder completed in the middle of
the series were check-coded. Since the re-
sults from both sets are substantially simi-
lar, both are presented in Table 1.
For 17 items whose percent agreement
was below 70 percent on the second set or
below approximately 75 percent on both
sets, an additional 25 interviews were check-
coded. For all but one of these items, the
percent agreement over these 25 was 75
percent or above.
Thus the data indicate that the code em-
ployed with these interviews can be and was




The major demographic characteristics of
the sample are presented in Table 2. As
noted earlier, the interview contained a
number of questions which dealt with the
respondents’ feelings concerning the assassi-
nation of President Kennedy. Seventeen of
these were closed-ended questions with four
alternatives each, representing gradations in
depth of feeling; these were taken directly
from an NORC study done at the time of
the assassination, using a national sample of
respondents (Sheatsley and Feldman, 1964).
A systematic comparison of the percentage
of respondents endorsing each alternative in
the present study with the percentages ob-
tained by NORC indicates only one differ-
ence : a smaller percentage of those in the
present study endorsed &dquo;Very deepest feel-
ing&dquo; on each question. This decrease, which
produces a difference larger than 10 percent
on only one item, is perhaps consistent with
the fact that our interviews were conducted
from four to six months after the assassina-
tion. The rank-order of percent endorsing
each alternative on a given item is the same
as that obtained in the NORC study. This
similarity to the national sample provides
evidence that, at least for these questions,
the present sample was representative of the
population.
INTEGRATION SCALES
In order to provide a meaningful analysis
of the data from the large variety of ques-
tions employed, scales were developed to tap
each of the three types of national commit-
ment or involvement.
Prior to any detailed analysis of the data,
a number of questions were selected which,
on the basis of the conceptual framework,
should be related to one of the three types.
Only those response categories for a given
item were included which the three authors
agreed should indicate one type of involve-
ment. A dichotomous distribution was con-
structed for each such item with &dquo;one&dquo; being
given the response indicative of symbolic,
normative, or functional involvement, and
&dquo;zero&dquo; the response indicating its absence.
In some cases, a +2 score was given to a
third category which indicated a higher de-
gree of that type of commitment, and/or a
-1 and -2 given to categories which indi-
cated the opposite of that type of involve-
ment. The latter was done only on items
where response categories were in terms of
strength of endorsement.
Some 15 to 20 items thus selected for
each type of commitment were intercorre-
lated using the phi coefficient ( Guilford,
1956). From these results, those items were
selected for inclusion in the scale which (a)
were correlated with at least one other item
at the p < .05 level or beyond, or (b) seemed
on a priori grounds to be closely related to
some aspect of that type of involvement.
The items employed in each of the three
scales and the scoring patterns adopted are
indicated in Tables 3a, 4a, and 5a. Tables
3b and 3c contain the item intercorrelation
and score distribution data respectively for
the Symbolic Scale; Table 4b and 4c provide
this information for the Normative Scale,
and Tables 5b and 5c provide it for the
Functional Scale.
Perusal of the items included in each scale
should indicate that they follow fairly di-
rectly from the conceptual framework. Par-
ticularly in the case of the Symbolic and
Normative scales, the items included appear
to tap the principal components of each type
of commitment. Of the item intercorrela-
tions within the Symbolic scale, 13 out of 28
were significant at the p < .05 level or
above. In the Normative scale, a smaller
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TABLE 3a
SYMBOLIC COMMITMENT SCALE: ITEMS AND RESPONSE DISTRIBUTIONS
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TABLE 3a ( Continued )
** One point only if coded in this category on both items.
TABLE 3b




c p ~.01 (4’=.227)
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NORMATIVE COMMITMENT SCALE: ITEMS AND RESPONSE DISTRIBUTIONS
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TABLE 4a ( continued )
TABLE 4b
NORMATIVE COMMITMENT SCALE: ITEM INTER-
RELATIONS; PHI COEFFICIENT
P <- 05 4, =.173
&dquo;p~.02 {cI> = .173~bp 6 .02 4i= .205<p~.01 (4-= 227)
number of phi coefficients were significant.
The Functional Commitment Scale was
less satisfactory. Here, some of the items
originally designed to tap this type of in-
volvement did not elicit responses which
could be employed as scale items. What re-
mains are six items; three of these are eco-
nomic in nature, and the scale is thus biased
in this respect. Also, these six show a gen-
TABLE 4c
NORMATIVE COMMITMENT SCALE: SCALE SCORE
DISTRIBUTION
erally nonsignificant pattern of relations
with one another.
Correlations between scores on each pair
of scales were computed. For this purpose,
the Pearson product-moment coefficient was
judged most appropriate, even though these
score distributions are not completely normal.
The resulting correlations are presented in
Table 6. The coefficients indicate that the
Symbolic and Normative scales are not en-
tirely independent, though the overlap in




FUNCTIONAL COMMITMENT SCALE: ITEMS AND RESPONSE DISTRIBUTIONS
DATA ANALYSIS
The small number of persons with a given
scale score value and the tentative nature
of the scales themselves led to a decision to
analyze the data in terms of score groups
on each scale rather than in terms of exact
score values. For these purposes, the dis-
tribution on each scale was divided into four
groups; cut-off lines were chosen to obtain
groups of roughly equal size which would
also be meaningful. These four groups are
designated: High (H), High-Medium (HM),
Low-Medium (LM), and Low (L), and their
composition is indicated on the scale score
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TABLE 5b
FUNCTIONAL COMMITMENT SCALE: ITEM INTER-
RELATIONS; PHI COEFFICIENT
a p ~ .05 (4) = .173) 
-.-_
6 .05 j 4i =.173)~p~ .01 (~=.22 )7
distribution tables, 3c, 4c, and 5c. Note that
the entire sample appears in each of these
distributions. It is not necessarily true that
the Low group on a given scale represents
the complete absence of that type of com-
mitment ; high, medium, and low are labels
that refer only to relative standing on these
scales.
PURE GROUPS ANALYSIS
In order to obtain meaningful compari-
sons between scale groups, the data were
analyzed by dividing the respondents into
what are termed &dquo;pure groups.&dquo; In this
analysis each person appears in a given com-
parison only once, on the basis of his stand-
ing on all three scales.
These &dquo;pure groups&dquo; were constructed as
follows: each person who was in the High
TABLE 5c





or HM group on one of the three individual
scales, and in the LM or Low group on the
other two scales, was classed as representing
the type of involvement tapped by the first
scale. Thus, the 22 respondents who were
in the High or HM groups on the Symbolic
scale and in the LM or Low groups on the
Normative and Functional scales comprise
the Symbolic (Sym) group. Similarly, there
were ten in the Normative (Norm) group
and 19 in the Functional (Func) group.
Also, those who were in the High or HM
group on all three scales were grouped to-
gether (HHH; N = 21), and those who were
in the LM or Low group on all three were
grouped (LLL; N = 20). The remaining 37
respondents, who were in the High or HM
groups on two of the three scales, were
lumped as &dquo;Other.&dquo;
The responses of each of these groups
were then tabulated for every item in the
interview schedule, and the major results of
this analysis are presented below. Here, we
are concerned with differences in endorse-
ment rates as a function of group member-
ship. That is, only the data for those items
in which two of the six pure groups differed
by at least 25 percent in endorsement rate
are included. This criterion is based on the
estimate that differences should be at least
this large, given the small N in each group,
before they become meaningful. What is
important in this analysis is the overall pat-
tern which emerges from those items which
show differences, and its consistency; differ-
ences on individual items are not of basic
importance.
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Each of the items on which differences in
response were found was placed in one of
the following nine categories:
Demographic characteristics;
Strength of commitment to the country;
Perception of the national role;
Perception of unique characteristics of
America;
Reactions to the assassination of President
Kennedy;
Attitudes toward US defense policies and
disarmament;
Attitudes toward foreign relations;
Attitudes toward supranational organizations;
and
Indications of passive alienation.
With the exception of demographic charac-
teristics, we conceive these as outcomes of
the type of commitment (especially the last
five groups). These categories will be con-
sidered in the order in which they are listed
above.
DEMOGRAPHIC ITEMS
The demographic items on which varia-
tion was found across groups are shown in
Table 7. Members of the Normative group
were more likely to be male, while members
of the Functional group were more likely
to be female; the ratio was about 50-50 in
the other groups. Age variation was quite
apparent; those in the Symbolic and Norma-
tive groups were much more likely to be
over 40 (as were the members of the HHH
and Other groups), while members of the
Functional group were most frequently
under 40. Educational differences were also
found; virtually no one in the Symbolic
group had attended college, while almost
everyone in the Functional group had. Oc-
cupationally, members of the Functional
group were slightly more frequently classed
as &dquo;professional-technical,&dquo; while only one
member of the Symbolic group was in this
category; these relations are reversed in the
&dquo;craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers&dquo;
category. Those in the Normative group
were more likely to be in jobs classed as
&dquo;operative and kindred workers.&dquo; Also, a
much higher proportion of those in the
Functional group than in either the Sym-
bolic or Normative reported incomes of
$8,000 or more. The education, income, and
occupation data are related, as is generally
the case; thus Functionals tended to be bet-
ter educated, have higher status jobs, and
have a higher income.
One item asked the respondent whether
he belonged to the &dquo;lower class,&dquo; &dquo;working
class,&dquo; &dquo;middle class,&dquo; or &dquo;upper class.&dquo; On
this &dquo;perceived status&dquo; item, those in the
Functional group were much less likely to
indicate that they belonged to the &dquo;working
class,&dquo; much more frequently report they
were members of the &dquo;middle class.&dquo; The
remaining groups were about equally likely
to pick either. When asked what the major
differences are between the two classes,
&dquo;None&dquo; was the most frequent response of
the Symbolic group, least often given by
members of the Functional one. Conversely,
the Functional was the only group to re-
spond with any frequency that education or
cultural factors are the primary difference.
The Symbolic group is distinguished from
the other five groups by the greater prefer-
ence of its members for religions classed as
&dquo;pietistic Protestant.&dquo; On the other hand,
members of the Functional group (and the
HHH) are more likely to attend church
weekly. Politically, the Normative group
less frequently indicated a preference for the
Republican party; its members were also
least likely to have voted in the 1960 presi-
dential and 1962 gubernatorial elections, or
to have voted Republican in both elections
(according to their reports). (The HHH and
Other groups have the highest proportion of





TABLE 7 ( continued )
1 See Table 2 for a list of the religions comprising this category.
true.) The Symbolic group’s members were
more likely to have voted in 1960 and 1962
than members of the Normative and Func-
tional groups.
As was true of the respondents them-
selves, the fathers of those in the Functional
group much more often had some college
education. The members of this group were
also more likely to have a father whose oc-
cupation was a &dquo;professional-technical&dquo; one
while they were growing up. Those in the
Normative group were most likely to have
grown up while the father was a craftsman
or foreman. Members of the Symbolic group
had most often grown up in farming families,
and those in the Functional group were least
likely to have done so.
Three items showing relations with score
group may be interpreted as indices of sta-
bility. Almost everyone in the Symbolic
group has lived in this area for at least 10
years, while those in the Normative and
Functional groups were the least likely to
have done so. On an item dealing with
number of moves, those in the Functional
(and LLL) group were most likely to have
moved at least three times in the past 10
years, and those in the Symbolic (and HHH)
were least likely to have moved this often.
Finally, the Normative and Symbolic group
members were somewhat more likely than
those in other groups to have been married
for at least 10 years.
A pair of items provides an indication of
rural-urban background differences between
the various score groups. The Symbolic and
Normative groups’ members were more likely
than those in the remaining groups to have
been raised on a farm and/or lived on one
for at least 10 years. Respondents in the
Functional group were least likely to have
such a rural background.
The next item shown in Table 7 provides
an index of entrepreneurial as against bureau-
cratic orientation. This question asked
whether pressing national problems should
be met by large government and private
organizations, by large private organizations,
or by the strengthening of individual free-
dom and responsibility. Endorsement of the
first alternative is taken as an indication of a
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bureaucratic orientation on the part of the
respondent. It can be seen that those in the
Normative and Functional groups most fre-
quently favored meeting national problems
with large organizations.
Finally, a series of items at the end of the
interview dealt with various types of activi-
ties in which respondents might participate.
First, each interviewee was asked what hob-
bies, sports, or crafts he engaged in, if any.
Looking at simply the number mentioned,
those in the Symbolic group were least likely
to mention none; those in the Normative and
Functional groups did so most frequently.
On an index of the predominant nature of
these activities, based on the coder’s judg-
ment, no one in the Functional group gave
active sports as his primary interest, while
those in the Symbolic and Normative groups
were more likely to do so. Another item
asked how often the respondent would say
he just did not know what to do with him-
self ; the members of the Symbolic group
were least likely to respond &dquo;Never.&dquo;
The respondent was also asked to name
all those organizations of which he was a
member. Although there were no striking
differences in the number named, it is in-
teresting to note that no one in either the
Normative or Functional groups named an
organization coded as social club first. On
the other hand, members of the latter two
groups were most likely (and, with two
people in the LLL groups, the only ones)
to name a &dquo;political or social action&dquo; organi-
zation. The coder, on the basis of all of the
respondent’s comments about his organiza-
tional participation, judged him as &dquo;Very,&dquo;
&dquo;Fairly,&dquo; &dquo;Somewhat,&dquo; &dquo;Slightly&dquo; or &dquo;Not&dquo;
active in organizations. On this index, those
in the Normative and Symbolic groups were
least frequently &dquo;Very active.&dquo; Finally, those
in the Symbolic group were least likely to
indicate that they never get together with
relatives, those in the Normative group most
likely to so state. The members of the Sym-
bolic and Normative groups were least likely
to say they never see their neighbors socially.
In sum, those in the Functional group
were more likely to be female and younger.
In contrast to the Symbolic group, they were
most likely to have some college education
and graduate training, to have professional
or highly skilled occupations, and to earn
more than $8,000 per year. Those in the
Normative group lie between the Functional
and the Symbolic on these dimensions.
Members of the Symbolic group were more
likely to have voted in both 1960 and 1962,
and to have voted Republican; those in the
Normative group were least likely to have
done either.
Respondents in the Functional group least
frequently came from a rural background,
more often came from a family with an edu-
cated, professional father, were the most
likely to have come to this area in the past
10 years, and tended to be more geographi-
cally mobile. Again, the Symbolic group’s
members show the reverse of these frequen-
cies. Finally, those in the Symbolic group
were most likely to have hobbies and to get
together with relatives and neighbors, while
those in the Functional group more often
appeared to be active in secondary associa-
tions and only rarely felt that they had noth-
ing to do.
STRENGTH OF COMMITMENT TO COUNTRY
A series of items can be interpreted as
indicating the respondent’s strength of com-
mitment to the country, in the sense that
they indicate the value he places on being
an American and living within the boundaries
of the United States. The data for these
items are presented in Table 8.
One of these items presented seven &dquo;things
that a young man may need to learn in life&dquo;:
knowing how to do his job well, being a
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TABLE 8
STRENGTH OF COMMITMENT TO COUNTRY
good family man, being a good American,
making a good income, being a good friend,
practicing his religion faithfully, and help-
ing his fellow man, in that order. These
were listed on a card given to the inter-
viewee, and he was asked &dquo;Which one of
these would be most important?&dquo; Members
of the Symbolic group (and of the HHH
group) were most likely to indicate that
&dquo;being a good American&dquo; is of greatest im-
portance for a child to learn. Those in the
Functional group, on the other hand, much
more frequently than any other group
ranked &dquo;helping his fellow man&dquo; as of pri-
mary importance; in fact, these people were
least likely to select being a good American.
This is borne out on an item which asked
whether appreciation of &dquo;the American way
of life&dquo; or of &dquo;different ways of life&dquo; is of
most importance; the Symbolic group was
less likely to select the latter, those in the
Functional group most likely to do so. Also,
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members of the Symbolic group were most
likely, the Functional least likely, to select
exile from the country as the worst fate a
man could suffer. (The five alternatives pre-
sented were: being poor and hungry, being
without friends, being without family, being
exiled from his country, and being without
religion, in that order.)
A series of items dealt with the conditions
under which the respondent would move
from the US. The Symbolic group was the
most resistant to leaving; its members were
by far the least likely to indicate that they
would consider moving, more likely to refuse
to consider moving for a better job (though
they so stated about as often as those in
three other groups), and only moderately
likely to move under threat of war. They
most frequently stated that nothing could be
done if a dictatorship developed here. Those
in the Functional group were among the
least likely to be resistant to moving as mea-
sured by these items, with the exception
that they less often would consider moving
under impending nuclear war than those in
the Normative group.
On a general item which asked whether
it is &dquo;a good idea or a bad idea&dquo; for Ameri-
cans to live in other countries, members of
the Functional group more often endorsed
it as a good idea; they were also much more
likely to believe that &dquo;doing away with na-
tional boundaries&dquo; is a good idea, with those
in the Symbolic and HHH groups least likely
to believe so. Again, on an item asking
whether a citizen who goes to live in Russia
should be allowed to keep his citizenship,
no one in the Symbolic group felt that he
should be allowed to do so, while those in
the Functional group most frequently stated
that he should.
NATIONAL ROLE
Having looked at the strength of commit-
ment of the respondents, let us turn to a
consideration of the content of the national
role as they perceived it. Table 9a shows
the results of those items related to the
nature of the role on which differences were
found as a function of score group on the
scales.
When asked what things reminded them
that they were Americans, those in the Nor-
mative group were somewhat more likely
spontaneously to mention America’s freedom
or democratic way of life; it is particularly
interesting that those in the LLL group were
least likely to so respond, those in the HHH
group most likely to do so.
The next question, also open-ended, asked
the respondent &dquo;What do you think a person
ought to do in order to be a good Ameri-
can ?&dquo; &dquo;Interpersonal morality&dquo; (e.g., getting
along with others, following the Golden Rule)
was more often mentioned spontaneously by
those in the Normative group. The center-
ing of this group’s orientation on general
norms is also clearly demonstrated by their
more frequently giving responses in the
category &dquo;violators of laws and/or general
norms&dquo; when asked who they thought were
not &dquo;good Americans.&dquo; These two responses
validate the Normative scale to some extent.
While those in the Functional group were
highly unlikely to mention such violators in
response to this question, they mentioned
right-wing extremists more often than the
other five score groups. Also, note the
parallel between the Symbolic and the HHH
groups’ responses to this question.
The next part of the interview schedule
consisted of a series of items, each of which
asked whether a person could be a good
American if he was engaged in a certain
activity, believed or did not believe in some
value or creed, or behaved in a certain way.
These were designed to provide more ex-
plicit information on the defining criteria
of an American. Members of the Functional
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TABLE 9a
PERCEPTION OF NATIONAL ROLE
( and LLL ) group much more frequently ac-
cepted as good Americans individuals who
believe in socialism, or who were once in the
Communist party, or who do not believe in
God. Those in the Symbolic and HHH
groups were the least likely to respond with-
out qualification that such persons could be
good Americans. On the other hand, the
Functional group was less likely to indicate
that someone who does not know the Con-
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stitution, or who believes in segregation,
could be a good American. The Normative
group stands out most clearly in its accept-
ance of someone who does not know the
Constitution or who believes in segregation.
Finally, on a summary index, members of
the Symbolic and HHH groups were more
likely to reject a person on four or more of
these characteristics as not being a good
American.
With some exceptions, these results may
in part be summarized as indicating that
those in the Symbolic group were much more
conservative in their views of the content of
the national role, that they emphasized
values such as freedom and a belief in God,
and were more exclusive in their view of
who is a good American (though the latter
may be an artifact of the criteria we pre-
sented).
The last item in this group to which dif-
ferential responses were made asked the re-
spondent whether he could think of condi-
tions under which an American should be
deprived of his citizenship. Those in the
Functional group were more likely to re-
spond spontaneously that treason-attempts
to undermine or overthrow the political sys-
tem-is such a condition, as were members
of the Normative group. On the other hand,
those in the Functional group least often
mentiQned Communists or other disloyal per-
sons. Also the Normative group somewhat
more frequently mentioned failure to meet
citizenship requirements, i.e., violation of
laws.
These results indicate that members of
the Functional group were more liberal in
their views of a &dquo;good American,&dquo; those in
the Symbolic group much more conserva-
tive in their definition. In addition, it pro-
vides some independent confirmation of the
emphasis which the Normative group places
on fulfilling legal and normative require-
ments, and on failure to meet such require-
ments as the distinguishing criterion of a
&dquo;bad American.&dquo; Finally, there is a striking
parallel between the response patterns of
those in the Symbolic group and the mem-
bers of the HHH group; this suggests that
the Symbolic orientation is a major compo-
nent of the substantive meaning of our HHH
classification.
A separate but related series of items
asked the respondent whether he had heard
of, and, if so, if he approved of, the activities
of seven organizations: American Medical As-
sociation (AMA); National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP);
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA);
United Fund; John Birch Society; House
Committee on Un-American Activities
(HUAC); and National Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy (SANE). Table 9b presents
the items in this series which elicited differ-
ential responses. There is a strong liberal-
conservative difference in the response pat-
tern obtained. The members of the Symbolic
group more often approved of conservative
organizations such as the Birch Society and
HUAC, and disapproved of the liberal
NAACP and SANE; the Functional group
more frequently approved of the latter and
disapproved of the former. The Normative
group is again intermediate between the
Symbolic and Functional.
UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS
One way to obtain information about the
content of the respondent’s view of America
and the &dquo;American way of life&dquo; is to see how
it differs from his perceptions of other coun-
tries. One group of items used to elicit in-
formation concerning perceived differences
consisted in presenting, individually, a series
of institutions or areas of life, and asking the
respondent whether and how the US dif-
fered in this respect from other countries.
The items in this group which were answered




Those in the Functional and LLL groups
were less likely than the remaining groups
to mention religious freedom as a difference
in religion in this country, while the mem-
bers of the Functional group were much
more likely to mention religious pluralism.
In the area of child-rearing, the Functional
group more frequently perceived it as less
strict in the US; those in the Normative
group were least likely, by a small per-
centage, to mention this. To the question
whether there is any special US music or art,
members of the Normative and Symbolic
groups most frequently responded &dquo;No&dquo; and
were less likely than those in other groups
to mention American &dquo;popular culture,&dquo; e.g.,
jazz, rock and roll. Finally, the members of
the three &dquo;pure&dquo; integration groups were
more likely than members of the other three
groups to perceive the US as differing on
at least three dimensions.
ASSASSINATION
As discussed earlier, questions were in-






Kennedy; these were taken from a survey
made by the National Opinion Research
Center (Sheatsley and Feldman, 1964) im-
mediately following that event. In all, some
twenty questions in the present study dealt
with the respondent’s reaction to and be-
havior following receipt of the news that
President Kennedy had been killed.
In sixteen of these items, the respondent
was presented with a statement describing
some reaction to the assassination. For each
he was asked to choose the one of four alter-
natives which best described his feelings:
&dquo;Very deepest feeling,&dquo; &dquo;Felt quite deeply,&dquo;
&dquo;Crossed my mind,&dquo; and &dquo;Never occurred to
me.&dquo; The interviewee was given a card on
which these four were listed, to which he
could refer as he responded to each state-
ment.
The assassination items to which the
groups responded differentially appear in
Table 11. It is interesting that members of
the Functional, LLL, and HHH groups were
somewhat more likely than members of the
other three groups to have attended special
services or memorials for President Kennedy.
Members of the Symbolic group much
more frequently reported that the sense of
loss of someone close was their very
deepest feeling, while members of the LLL
group were least likely to so respond. Sorrow
for Kennedy’s family was reported to be a
very deepest feeling by about the same per-
centage of each group except the Normative
and LLL. Also, anger was reported as a
very strong reaction by a high proportion of
all groups, but more frequently by the Sym-
bolic and Functional (and Other) groups.
Those in the LLL group were least likely to
have worried about how the country would
carry on (i.e., a higher percentage of them
indicated this concern did not occur to
them); those in the Normative group were
most likely to have worried about this at
some level of intensity. Very few reported
that the thought that Kennedy had brought
it on himself was a deep or very deepest
feeling; it never occurred to most of the
347
sample. However, it did occur to some and
apparently differentially. It was least likely
to have &dquo;crossed my mind&dquo; to members of
the Functional group, most likely to those
in the HHH group. Finally, feeling ashamed
that it happened was a deepest feeling of
numerous respondents, though less often in
the LLL group and most often in the HHH
group.
Emotional reactions (e.g., anger, sorrow)
thus appear to have been especially strong
in the Symbolic group. They most frequently
reported such reactions, and the LLL group
least frequently had such reactions at a deep
level. The latter seems to be indicative of a
lack of active involvement by members of
this group. The Normative and Functional
groups showed no particular pattern in their
responses to these items.
ATTITUDES TOWARD DEFENSE POLICIES
Many items included in the schedule were
designed to obtain information as to the rela-
tive importance the respondent places on
military power and the need for military de-
fense. The items in this category to which
the score groups responded differently are
indicated in Table 12.
The first item established a hypothetical
situation in which the respondent had to
choose between two candidates for President
of the United States: one who stated that
the most important thing facing America is
&dquo;to win the Cold War against Communism
around the world,&dquo; and one who said it was
&dquo;to do away with poverty and improve con-
ditions here at home.&dquo; The majority of each
group responded that they would support a
candidate who emphasized internal condi-
tions, except for the HHH group, in which
a large percentage would support the Cold
War candidate. On a two-choice item that
asked whether the safety and happiness of
the American people or the protection of
freedom throughout the world was more im-
portant, the Normative group slightly more
often than the Symbolic and Functional
selected the former, while those in the HHH
group did so much more frequently. A dif-
ferential concern with a powerful military is
evident; the majority of the Symbolic and
Normative groups believed that a powerful
military is more important than individual
freedom and prosperity, while 85 percent of
the Functional group believed the latter is
more important.
A large majority of those in the Symbolic
and Normative groups believed the US is
&dquo;pretty strong and safe,&dquo; while members of
the Functional (and LLL and HHH) group
were more likely to choose the other alterna-
tive presented, that &dquo;some things seriously
threaten us.&dquo; There was no variation in the
types of things mentioned as threats. Con-
sistent with this finding, only one member
of the Functional group indicated that the
US is doing everything possible to prevent
war; the members of this group much more
frequently responded spontaneously that
increased educational and cultural exchanges
are something the US could be doing.
With regard to questions concerning dem-
onstrations against nuclear testing, it is in-
teresting that members of the Normative
and Functional groups were more likely to
report that they had heard of such demon-
strations, with those in the Symbolic group
least likely to so report. The Functional
group, when asked what kinds of people
they think engage in such activities, much
more frequently responded that they are sin-
cere and dedicated individuals (the remain-
ing categories consisted of various negative
categorizations). Finally, the members of
the Functional group were the only ones
who indicated personal support for these
demonstrations with any frequency.
When asked how they felt about the US
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spending &dquo;$60 billion a year on arms and
defense,&dquo; those in the Functional and LLL
groups were most likely to feel that this was
too much, with no one in the Normative
group so responding. When asked for their
reasons, members of the two former groups
most often felt it was too much because US
defense needs are not that great. (Those in
the Symbolic group who felt it was too
much all responded that waste and useless
spending was the reason.) Normative group
members most often felt our spending was
about right because our defense needs re-
quired it. When asked to rank five possible
uses of money saved due to disarmament
(increase public welfare programs, increase
foreign aid, reduce national debt, build high-
ways and schools, and reduce taxes), those
in the Functional group most frequently
selected increased welfare programs as the
best use, while those in the Symbolic and
HHH groups most often selected reduction
of the government debt. About one-third of
each group, except Symbolic and HHH,
chose the construction of additional high-
ways and schools as the best use.
Finally, when asked how they felt about
the power of the military, those in the Sym-
bolic and HHH groups were most likely to
feel we do not pay enough attention to our
military leaders.
A heavy emphasis by those in the Sym-
bolic group on military strength is evidenced
in this analysis. They more often believed
that a strong military is more important than
individual freedom and national prosperity;
that our defense spending is high because
it is necessary; and that we do not pay
enough attention to military leaders. At the
same time, they more frequently felt we are
strong and safe; those in the Functional
group more often felt we are threatened, but
that increased exchanges rather than a larger
defense plant is the answer. Members of the
Functional group also showed greater sup-
port for disarmament. The HHH group ap-
pears to contain some of both kinds of em-
phasis, which is consistent with its members
being high on all three of the scales, though




Several sets of items dealt with attitudes
toward our relations with other nations.
Those on which differences in responses
were found across score groups are shown
in Table 13.
One question asked what our government
should do when foreign governments take
over property and plants in those countries
owned by US business interests. In spon-
taneous answers, those in the Functional
group most frequently emphasized negotia-
tion and peaceful settlement as the appro-
priate action, while no one in the Normative
and only one person in the Symbolic group
gave this response. In response to the ques-
tion whether American investments overseas
are the interest only &dquo;of certain American
investors and businessmen or those of all
Americans,&dquo; members of the Normative
group were much more likely to mention
the latter. At the same time, members of the
Symbolic and Normative groups slightly
more often indicated that these interests
have nothing to do with their own.
Several sets of forced-choice items were
employed which dealt with US responsibili-
ties in other parts of the world, foreign aid,
relations with Russia, and relations with
Cuba. Each set consisted of several state-
ments with which the respondent was asked
whether he &dquo;strongly agreed,&dquo; &dquo;slightly
agreed,&dquo; &dquo;slightly disagreed,&dquo; or &dquo;strongly
disagreed.&dquo; Members of the Symbolic group
appeared to be more isolationist; they least
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often strongly agreed that the US should be
concerned with problems in other parts of
the world.
The various pure groups responded dif-
ferentially to three items concerning foreign
aid. First, those in the Symbolic and HHH
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groups most frequently endorsed limiting
our foreign aid to countries which favor our
policies, while those in the Functional group
least often endorsed this. On the other hand,
members of the Functional and LLL groups
most frequently favored giving aid to any
country which needs it, while the Normative
group least frequently agreed with this.
Finally, those in the Normative and Sym-
bolic groups were less likely to favor eco-
nomic aid programs being run by the UN
rather than by individual nations; i.e., these
individuals were most concerned about
American loss of control over such programs.
In the area of relations with Russia, those
in the Symbolic and LLL groups were least
likely, members of the Normative group
most likely, to disagree strongly that the
only way to preserve &dquo;our way of life&dquo; is to
attack Russia. The Functional and Norma-
tive groups were more likely to endorse the
statement that the US should accept equality
of power with Russia; the same groups were
least likely to agree strongly that the US
must run any risk of war necessary to block
Communism, while the HHH group much
more often strongly agreed with this. For
each of the six items dealing with Russia, it
was possible to designate either agreement
or disagreement as an &dquo;aggressive&dquo; response;
therefore, an index of the number of items
each respondent endorsed in such a direction
was constructed. No one in the Functional
group answered two or more items in an
aggressive direction, while those in the
HHH and Other groups most often did so.
With respect to Cuba, members of the
HHH and Other groups were least likely to
disagree strongly that we should invade
Cuba now, while the great majority of per-
sons in the Functional group did so. At the
same time, only one person in the Normative
group and one-third of the Functional group
endorsed aiding anti-Castro refugees; the
remaining groups were more likely to favor
such aid. Those in the Functional group
were most favorable to resuming trade rela-
tions with Cuba, those in the HHH group
least favorable. On a summary index con-
structed in the same fashion as the one deal-
ing with Russia, members of the Normative
group were least likely to endorse four or
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ATTITUDES TOWARD SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
more items concerning Cuba in an aggres-
sive direction, those in the HHH group most
likely to do so.
Thus a more passive, negotiation-oriented
stance by the Functional group appears in
this analysis, though the Normative group-
while not mentioning negotiation in property
confiscation situations-seems even less ag-
gressive toward Cuba. Members of the
HHH group are by far the most aggressive
in orientation in the present analysis.
ATTITUDES TOWARD SUPRANATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
A number of items dealt with attitudes
toward supranational organizations and US
relations with such bodies. Those to which
the various groups responded differentially
appear in Table 14.
Given the results in the preceding section,
it is interesting that the Functional and
HHH groups were most likely to endorse
strongly the establishment of world govern-
ment. The members of the Functional group
were much more likely to favor increasing
the power of the UN, while those in the
Symbolic and LLL groups were least favor-
able to such an increase. Consistently, the
Symbolic group’s members were most wary
of putting too much faith in the UN, those
in the Functional group least so. Finally,
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the Symbolic group most frequently agreed
that we should not yield to an international
organization’s directives, while those in the
Normative and Functional groups least often
endorsed this statement.
One item asked whether the US should
remain in the UN, and why or why not.
While there was no large variation in the
percentage who felt the US should, there
was variation in the frequency with which
hwo specific reasons were given. Members
of the Functional group were most likely to
indicate that the US should stay because the
UN is effective, while those in the HHH and
LLL, as well as the Functional, groups more
often indicated that, while perhaps not ef-
fective, it is our only hope-a beginning.
When asked whether young men should be
required to serve in the US Army or given
a choice between serving in a US or a UN
force, those in the Functional and LLL
groups most often favored giving Americans
a choice between serving in the US Army
or a UN Army.
The last two items in Table 14 dealt with
the International Court. The first, after ex-
plaining its nature and purpose, asked the
respondent which of two statements he
agreed with: &dquo;Nations should not go to the
International Court on disagreements which
affect their vital national interests,&dquo; or &dquo;All
nations should take their disputes to the
International Court and accept its decisions
even if it decides against them.&dquo; It can be
seen that those in the Normative and Func-
tional groups were most likely to endorse the
latter, while those in the Symbolic and LLL
groups were least likely to do so. The next
item on the schedule asked which of these
should be US policy toward the Court.
Here, note that all groups were less likely
to endorse accepting decisions adverse to
US interests than they were to endorse the
general statement; the relative degree of
endorsement remained the same, with the
exception that the Normative group was no
longer more likely to endorse this than other
groups.
Thus the Functional group was most
favorable toward a strong international body
and the United Nations, even at the cost of
some US independence in decisions, while
the Symbolic group was most concerned
about preserving the latter. The HHH group
fluctuated more in its responses to these
items, and did not parallel any integration
group; neither did the LLL group.
ALIENATION ITEMS
The final group of items are those which
dealt with perceived personal effectiveness
or competence; the absence of such a
perception indicates passive alienation or
apathy, at least in the sense that the person
feels he has no influence over what happens
to him. The items of this nature which were
related to score group membership are shown
in Table 15.
The first six items deal with whether the
respondent feels he has any influence over
the policies and actions of the government,
i.e., his political effectiveness. With the ex-
ception of the first item, all were four-choice,
closed-end items of the type discussed above.
Each could be answered in a direction indi-
cating that the respondent felt he had politi-
cal influence or that he did not (e.g., agree-
ment that working in groups is effective).
A summary index was constructed of the
number of items the respondent answered in
a manner indicating perceived political ef-
fectiveness.
When asked if there was anything they
could do personally to prevent war, those in
the Functional group were much less likely
to respond &dquo;no,&dquo; and much more frequently
responded that they could engage in various




bolic and Normative groups were most likely
to respond with the former, least likely to
respond with the latter.
It can be seen that, on the summary index
of perceived political effectiveness, the Func-
tional and LLL groups were most likely to
view themselves as effective. Thus, mem-
bers of the Functional group most often
strongly endorsed working in groups as an
effective influence on the government, were
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least likely to agree that voting is their only
means of influence, were more likely to view
letter-writing as valuable, and were less likely
to agree that they have no say. The Norma-
tive, Symbolic, and HHH groups viewed
themselves as least effective in these terms.
Those in the Symbolic and HHH groups
were most likely to agree that such matters
seem so complicated they do not understand
them (but so did a high percentage of the
Functional group’s members).
A final set of six items, also four-choice,
can be interpreted as indicating personal
alienation; these were taken from a study by
Tumin (1958). The score groups showed
variation in their responses to three of these
items. In terms of their responses to these
items, the Symbolic group was the most
alienated from the political and social sys-
tem. Members of this group were much
more likely to agree that one has to live for
today, to agree strongly that one does not
know who he can count on, and to believe
it is not fair to bring children into the world.
Interestingly, the Functional and the Nor-
mative groups were least alienated and least
likely to agree with the above statements.
Finally, to an open-end question asking
whether anything in the news especially
worried them or made them feel good, mem-
bers of the Functional group were least
likely to respond that nothing in the news
especially worried them or made them feel
especially good, i.e., they were most likely
to recall specific things to which they re-
acted in these ways. The Symbolic group
was most likely to respond that nothing
made them feel particularly good, the LLL
group that nothing especially worried them.
(Recall that the assassination was during the
year preceding the interview, and thus could
have been mentioned in response to the
latter.)
It would seem, then, that the functionally
integrated most often perceive themselves
as politically effective and are lowest in feel-
ings of alienation, as measured by these
questions. The symbolically integrated are
most likely to feel alienated, and among the
least likely to feel effective in exercising
political influence.
Conclusion
With some exceptions, the pure-groups
analysis is surprisingly consistent with the
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results of separate comparisons of high and
low scorers on each individual scale.10 These
comparisons verified and strengthened the
relationships found in the present analysis.
In this sense, the pure-groups analysis is a
fairly comprehensive representation of the
entire set of data.
In general, the data are supportive of
the overall formulation and the specific hy-
potheses upon which this study is based.
We have fairly clear evidence of the strong
affect that characterizes the symbolically in-
volved person, e.g., from the questions deal-
ing with the assassination. He does indeed
give high ranking to the role of national
compared to other roles, and our data sug-
gest that he is less tolerant of behavior or
values that deviate from role prescriptions
(cf. Table 9a). Similarly, the normatively
involved person’s concern with general norms
is evidenced in many of his responses, e.g.,
that violators of norms are not &dquo;good&dquo; Ameri-
cans. There is also evidence of his tendency
to accept policies that he views as generally
agreed upon, e.g., the amount spent by the
US for defense (cf. Table 12). As expected,
the normatively committed are more likely
to be working class people.
The data support most clearly our con-
ceptualization of the functionally committed.
These respondents are, in fact, upper-middle
and upper class individuals; they have the
highest incomes and highest status jobs, and
they are the most educated in the sample.
Their responses to a number of questions
indicate an emphasis on political and social
responsibilities as the primary elements of
the national role, and they are better in-
formed about national organizations and
more likely to remember events in the news
(cf. Table 15). This high level of support
for the hypotheses is even more encouraging
in view of our impression that the Functional
scale was the poorest of the three.
Moreover, the three groups do show the
expected differences in attitudes toward
supranational organizations. The symboli-
cally committed respondents are the most
negative in their reactions toward the UN
and the International Court, and the func-
tionally involved are the most positive. The
Normative group occupies an intermediate
position. On other issues of foreign policy
there were consistent differences between
the Symbolic and Functional groups, with
the symbolically committed taking a more
traditional nationalistic position. The Nor-
mative group showed a variable pattern,
sometimes more conservative than the Sym-
bolic group, at other times much less so.
These data are of course only suggestive
because of the small number of cases and
the imprecision of the measuring instru-
ments. Moreover, the findings are subject
to varying interpretations. For example, it is
possible to explain the relationship between
functional involvement and openness to in-
ternational cooperation as simply a product
of higher levels of education and information.
There is some reason, however, for believing
that both educational level and a responsible
position in the bureaucratic structure facili-
tate functional involvement and that these
two variables interact. With a larger sample
the complex relationships of educational
level, economic status, position in the bu-
reaucratic structure, functional orientation
toward the nation, and attitudes toward in-
ternational affairs could be ascertained.
Another major issue is the nature of the
HHH and LLL groups (consistently high or
consistently low on all types of involvement)
relative to the three &dquo;pure&dquo; groups. The
10 The latter analyses are not reported here
in the interest of brevity. The results of these
analyses are reported in DeLamater (1966),
available from the Center for Research on Con-
flict Resolution, The University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104.
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LLL group does not appear to be alienated.
In fact, it is probable that there were no
alienated persons in our sample; perhaps it
was these people who refused to be inter-
viewed. What then do they represent? Some
of the data suggest that the HHH and LLL
groups are opposite poles of a dimension, per-
haps a dimension of liberalism-conservatism
which is somewhat independent of the nature
of commitment, one which cuts across the
Symbolic, Normative, and Functional groups.
The LLL are liberal, well-educated, etc.,
while the HHH are uniformly the most ag-
gressive conservative group in the &dquo;pure-
groups&dquo; analysis.
A third problem has to do with the rela-
tionships between our three types of com-
mitment and the relative compatibility of
various kinds of mixtures. In general, there
is greater incongruity between functional
and symbolic commitment than between the
normative and either of the other types,
though a few individuals in our sample
were high on all three. Normative accept-
ance of the national system can be readily
combined with either a functional or a sym-
bolic orientation without logical difficulty.
Perhaps this is the reason the polarization of
opinion occurred between the symbolically
and functionally committed groups whereas
the normative individuals sometimes were
intermediate in position to the other two and
sometimes much closer to one than the other.
Our theoretical position is that any one of
these three types can bind the individual
into the social system, that the typology ap-
plies to the process and not necessarily to
the specific individual, but that for many
people there may be a preferred mode of
integration.
In fine, this report of a field study sug-
gests the importance of further critical ex-
ploration of the dimensions of nationalism
which will take into account (a) the emotional
attachment to symbolic values and their in-
dicators, (b) the acceptance of the normative
demands of the system as legitimate, and
(c) the perceived rewards from system mem-
bership. These three dimensions should re-
late differentially both to attitudes on domes-
tic policy and to attitudes on foreign policy.
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